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Abstract
Security of quantum key distribution of existing quantum
cryptographic protocols - basically pure state protocols - has
yet to be unconditionally, unquestionably and realistically
proved. We observe that this objective, in an alternative
way, can be reliably fulfilled if security is guaranteed within
the raw protocol. But in presence of noise, existing raw pro-
tocols can not ensure that security since errors due to de-
coherence and eavesdropping (within the decoherence rate
) are intrinsically indistinguishable that necessitates further
modifications of the raw protocols with the help of classical
or quantum error correction techniques. And these mod-
ifications, particularly for full security proof, may not be
reliable enough because of the non-existence of experimen-
tal probe to test the validity of the proof. To remove this
difficulty, using mixed state, here we present an alternative
procedure of quantum cryptography, where unconditional se-
curity is an intrinsic property of the raw protocol. In this
approach, the two different sequences of quantum states, hav-
ing same density matrix, represent two logical bits. These
two sequences, initially shared between the legitimate users,
perfectly produce arbitrarily long string of bits in presence
of noise without performing any error corrections and us-
ing classical channel. Removal of classical channel (exist-
ing quantum cryptography requires classical channel to op-
erate) indicates conceptually quantum mechanics favors this
mixed state crypto-system. This crypto-system can be im-
plemented over arbitrarily long distance using existing tech-
nology.
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On the basis of seminal work of Wiesner [1]; Bennett and Brassard first in-
vented quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol[2], and followed by their
work other QKD protocols[3-9] have been proposed with a view to achieve
unconditional security so as to outperform classical public key distribution
technique since it provides conditional security. But noise is the hindrance
to achieve this goal due to the fact, eavesdropper, manipulating noise, can
jeopardize the security of QKD. So far, considering noise security of QKD has
been conditionally proved [10-12]. On the other hand, Mayers[13-14], Lo and
Chau[15], and independently Lo[16] have presented some unconditional secu-
rity proofs. But there is no unanimity[12,15,17] on the correctness of Mayers’
proofs. The security proofs given by Lo and Chau and independently by Lo
are based on fault-tolerant theory of quantum computation (FTQC) which
is itself an untested theory. So their proofs will have to bear the uncertainty
until FTQC is experimentally verified. Apart from these proofs, other re-
searchers are also actively working[17] to prove unconditional security. But
we observe that 100% reliability for complete security proof can be attained
only after its experimental verification. At present, no such verification tech-
niques exist. Then how would we get rid of the uncertainty ? We think,
uncertainty regarding the security issue most reliably can be removed if raw
protocol provides unconditional security without proving security at all. But
the problem is that, existing protocols can not fulfill this simple demand. In
the existing protocols, each individual state represents bit, and some of the
bits will always be corrupted either by enviromental noise or by eavesdrop-
per induced noise, which can not be distinguished by any means. Therefore,
to prove unconditoinal security, error needs to be corrected in a completely
secure way. By contrast, in our alternative approach, individual state does
not represent bit but collectively they do. Later we shall see, this statistical
feature (in addition to the other features) of encoding bits plays crucial role
in achieving security avoiding the so-called error correction methods.
The basic idea behind this approach is to produce arbitrarily long sequence
of bits randomly choosing the two comparatively short sequences, represent-
ing logical 0 and 1. In this method, the two sequences are two alternative
preparation procedures of density matrix of the mixed state. The sequences
are shared between the legitimate users.
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As an illustration, let us take the two sequences of quantum states :
Sn0 = fψ1 ψ1 ψ2 ψ1 ψ2 ψ2 ψ2 ψ1....g; Sn1 = fφ1 φ2 φ2 φ1 φ1 φ2 φ1 φ2....g, where
Sn0 and S
n
1 stand for bit 0 and 1 respectively and n is the total number of
states in the sequences. These two sequences Sn0 and S
n
1 are shared between
sender Alice, and receiver Bob. The key, the sequence of sequences, is :
KN = fSn0 Sn1 Sn1 Sn0 Sn1 Sn0 Sn1 Sn0 Sn0 Sn1 ....g , where N is the number of bits
in the key. It is non-trivial to mention that the states in the sequences may
or may not be orthogonal, types of states in the sequences can be more
than two, and even two sequences can be prepared minimally just by the
same two states, but the density matrix of the two sequences must be same
i.e. ρS0 = ρS1 . We shall construct the equivalent density matrix using two
different pairs of nonorthogonal state vectors of four dimensional Hilbert-
space. From this protocol, the modus operandi of other protocols, based on
this alternative approach, can be easily understood. This particular protocol
can be used for standard two party secure communication and for the purpose
of message splitting[18,19].
Before proceeding further, let us pinpoint that, the unconditional security
of our crypto-system is based on the following well established propositions.
1. Sequences of known quantum states representing same density matrix are
indistinguishable to all, except to the generator(s) of the sequences. 2. It is
impossible to measure quantum state without disturbing it. 3. Decoherence
is a stochastic process.
First, we describe preparation procedures of the shared sequences. Sup-
pose, in a secret place, Alice and Bob are given 2n number of horizontally
polarized (j$i) incoherent photons. They divide the photons into two halves
to produce two sequences. To produce Sn0 , they split the wave function of
each of the n photons with a symmetric (50:50) beam splitter. Now they do
one of the two things in the path s : toss a coin, and if the result is ”head”,
unitarily rotates the polarization by 90◦(j$is −! jlis) and if ”tail” she
does nothing (j$is −! j$is). In the other path, called r, they do nothing








To produce Sn1 , similarly after splitting the state of each of the remaining n
photons, they do one of the two things in the path s : toss a coin; if ”heads”,
unitarily rotates by 45◦(j$is −! j%.is) and if ”tail”, unitarily rotates by








These states can be represented by the following base states:
j$ir, jlir, j$is, jlis
In this basis, the density matrix of the two sequences is,
ρ = 1/4

2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

Needless to say, Alice and Bob both are generators of the sequences and
they can generate/share the two sequences even in absence of photons. Now
they are separated. Assuming Alice sends a single bit, either Sn0 or S
n
1 , we
shall first describe the Bob’s method of identification of the bit. Bob can
independently identify the bit in different ways since he knows the prepa-
ration codes. Whatever be the identification processes, Bob’s objective is
to find out the correlation of conclusive results of measurements with the
shared sequences. For this protocol, we shall describe a particular method
of identification.
In this method, Bob uses two sets of dual analyzers (DA) on the two
resulting paths. The orientations of DA are : i) DA0 = f0◦ : 0◦g ii) DA1 =
f0◦ : 45◦g. The measurements produce three types (A,B,C) of results: A =
(
p
r : s),B= (r :
p
s),C = (r : s) where ”
p
” and ”  ” stand for ”
Yes” and ” No” results respectively. The probabilities of these three kind of
results for the four different superposition states are given in table 1 and 2
considering the statistical weight of the states and orientations of the dual
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analyzers. The results A and B provide which-path (WP ) information and
the result C gives no-path (NP )information. But mere WP information is
not enough to identify the state, and therefore the bit. Bob needs which-
path of which-state (WPWS) information. The result A does not give any
WPWS information for any of the above two settings of DA. The NP
information of result C is always inconclusive for any settings of the DA. The
only result B provides conclusive WPWS information for proper choice of
above two settings of DA. The WPWS information conclusively determines
the state jψ1i for DA0 and the state jφ1i for DA1.
As Bob does not know the bit in advance, he always uses both sets of DA.
Bob, tossing coin, uses any of the two sets of DA against each event. The
measurements yield two sets of random results. As an illustration, let the se-
quences of results be : R0 =fAABABACC....g and R1= fBAAACCAB....g,
where R0 is the results when Bob used DA0 and R1 is the results when Bob
used DA1. Firstly, Bob discards inconclusive results from both the sets.
So the reduced sequences are: R
n/8
0 = fBBBBBBBBBB...g and Rn/81 =
fBBBBBBBBBB....g where n/8 is the reduced length of the sequences,
and the sequences are nonidentical in terms of the position (event number)
of the identical elements B. At this point, Bob knows one of the reduced se-
quences contains conclusive WPWS information, but does not know which
one. To know, first, he discards the states corresponding to discarded events
from both of the shared sequences. Therefore, the length of the shared se-
quences are reduced. Now with these two reduced sequences of results and
two reduced sequences of states, he performs four correlation tests to identify
the bit. Out of these tests, only one of the reduced sequences of result would
be totally correlated (assuming noise is not present) with one of the reduced
sequences of states. For clarity, suppose, if the bit is 0 then the reduced se-
quences of shared states are: R
n/8
0 = fψ1 ψ1 ψ1 ψ1 ψ1 ψ1 ψ1 ψ1 ψ1 ψ1......g and
R
n/8
1 = fφ1 φ2 φ1 φ1 φ2 φ2φ1 φ2 φ2 φ1....g. The outcome of statistical tests are:
1. R
n/8
1 6= Sn/81 2. Rn/80 = Sn/80 3. Rn/81 6= Sn/80 4. Rn/80 6= Sn/81 . Equality of
two sets means complete correlation. So the test 2 reveals that bit is 0.
The proposition 1 ensures unconditional security of this single bit. Now
they have to create large number of bits or logically at least 2n + 1 bits
since they can always have unconditional security of 2n bits ( total number
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of shared states) using ” one time pad” technique[20]. So they have to use
the same shared sequences again and again. This repetitive use of the same
sequences is clearly against the spirit of Shannon’s theory of cryptography[20]
and meant to loosing the advantage of extended no-cloning principle[21] that
can be stated as: sequence of quantum states can not be cloned from a single
copy of that sequence. Therefore, intercepting all the sequences of an arbi-
trarily long key, Eve, the eavesdropper, can exactly clone the two sequences
and she can send the cloned sequences to Bob. In favor of eavesdropping,
it is assumed that Eve uses very fast superlaminal signal to compensate the
long time delay caused by her measurements. At this point, it seems that the
advantage of uncertainty principle (measurement creates unavoidable distur-
bances) is lost. In the next sections, we shall discuss that the advantage
of uncertainty principle can be taken by simple strategies suitable for ideal
and nonideal environments. The strategies are same for all kind of measure-
ments/attacks and applicable for all protocols belonging to this alternative
procedure.
So far Alice and Bob allow Eve to access all the sequences. To exploit
uncertainty principle, Alice will not send any new sequence/bit, until she
is confirmed that Bob has truly got her bit. Therefore, Bob has to inform
Alice whether the bit was intercepted or not. He can inform Alice without
using classical channel. If bits are successfully received by Bob, he can send
them back to Alice using another two shared sequences, having same density
matrix, through the reverse arrangement of the apparatus. Alice following
similar measurements can know that bit has reached to Bob. If Eve inter-
cepts, then she will have to prepare the sequence on her guess. It will create
50% errors. As a consequence, Bob could not identify the bit. Bob can send
totally depolarized photons to make Alice aware about interception. If Eve
intercepts only the Bob’s bit, then also bit is not returned to Alice. For both
situations, Alice will stop transmission. Here, single-bit interception will be
considered as total jamming of the channel that Eve can always do for all
sorts of communications.
Let us come to the nonideal case. To impersonate as noise, indeed, eaves-
dropping has to be stochastic. So, eavesdropper can intercept some random
events of every sequence determined by the noise level and her measurements.
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However interception is random, there is a nonzero probability of acciden-
tal coincidence of events of identical sequences. The states of coincidental
events can be cloned, if not totally. To help eavesdropper, it is assumed that
statistics of the coincidental events is high. For a long key, Eve, in guise of
noise, can gain more and more information and ultimately complete infor-
mation about the two sequences. Note that, cloning is possible as because
Eve knows the event number of each intercepted photons since she knows
the length of the sequences. They can deprive her from this information.
Therefore randomly intercepted events can not be correlated until and un-
less she knows the length of the two sequences. Eve can know the length
if she intercepts consecutively many sequences/bits. But we have already
discussed that even single-bit interception will not be allowed. If Eve still
intercepts they will know by the above procedures. So in presence of noise
unconditional security - security of each single bit - can be achieved with-
out using classical channel (even message can be directly sent[7] using only
quantum channel). Hence, the procedure can arbitrarily amplify the shared
information surmounting Shannon’s ”no-go” theorem of repetition[20].
The protocol can be extended for the purpose of distributing information
[18,19] between two receivers so that none of them individually acts on the
secret key. To elucidate, suppose there are two receivers, Bob and Sonu,
in the two resulting paths leading to the two secret rooms of the receiving
center, where Bob is on the path r and Sonu on the path s and both of them
share the sequences to be used to generate the key with Alice. Notice that,
only s is the bit-carrying path. So Sonu independently can identify bit, but
Bob can not. Bob always gets the same truncated state j$ir. To give equal














For sake of Bob, Alice can prepare bits/sequences (Bob shares the preparation
procedures) with these new superposition states. Due to this action, both of
them are in similar position. Now if Alice randomly selects paths to encode
7
the sequences, both of them will get 50% bits. So they have to co-operate
to access the full key. Of course, they have to feedback each bit to Alice
for authentication of the channel using their private sequences shared with
Alice. Splitting the state vector into many paths and making every path
as bit-carrying path at random, the protocol can be extended to distribute
information among many users. As for example, the states can be split into
three parts r, s and t for three receivers as follows,
jψ1i = 1/
p
3(j$ir + j$is + j$it)
jψ2i = 1/
p
3(j$ir + j$is + jlit)
jφ1i = 1/
p
3(j$ir + j$is + j%.it)
jφ2i = 1/
p
3(j$ir + j$is + j-&it)
The same density matrix of the sequence of states ψ1 and ψ2 (1:1) and the
sequence of states φ1 and φ2 (1:1) in the representation R corresponding to
the base states: j$ir, jlir, j$is, jlis, j$it, jlit is,
ρ = 1/6

2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

Here bit-carrying path is t, so only receiver on path t will get the bit. If
Alice randomly changes the bit-carrying path giving equal importance to
each path, then each of the three receivers will get 33.33% bits of the key.
This is a democratic distribution. Alice can also make unequal distribution
of message among the receivers.
The practical advantage of these crypto-systems is that they can operate
as long as noise is not 100% provided the statistics of the uncorrupted states
is sufficient for identification of the sequences. So the outstanding problem
of distant quantum communication (quantum signal can not be amplified
and the technology of ”quantum repeater”[15] is still in prenatal stage) can
be overcome by this statistical approach. Reported error rates (3-4% for
24-60 Km)[22-23] indicates that, it might be possible to communicate over
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several hundreds of kilometers using only few thousands of photons in the
sequences. We are even optimistic about secure continental and satellite com-
munication[24] with not-too-high statistics. For arbitrarily long distance, it
is reasonable to set relay centers than arbitrarily increasing the statistics of
the shared sequences.
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Table 1. Joint probabilities when DA at (0◦ : 0◦)
states p(
p
r : s) p(r :
p
s) p(r : s)
1/
p
2(j$ir + j$is) 1/4 1/4∗ 0
1/
p
2(j$ir + jlis) 1/4 0 1/4
1/
p
2(j$ir + j%.is) 1/4 1/8 1/8
1/
p
2(j$ir + j-&is) 1/4 1/8 1/8
* Only this result provides conclusive WPWS information.
Table 2. Joint probabilities when DA at (0◦ : 45◦)
states p(
p
r : s) p(r :
p
s) p(r : s)
1/
p
2(j$ir + j$is) 1/4 1/8 1/8
1/
p
2(j$ir + jlis) 1/4 1/8 1/8
1/
p
2(j$ir + j%.is) 1/4 1/4∗ 0
1/
p
2(j$ir + j-&is) 1/4 0 1/4
* Only this result provides conclusive WPWS information.
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